ERASURE OF THE “PATRIOT ACT” FROM THE US CODE OF LAWS

By Greg Penglis and Grok AI, June 11, 2025

Introduction:

There is nothing more unpatriotic than the Patriot Act. There is nothing closer to a secret police ministry of internal security administration like the Soviet KGB or the Nazi Gestapo than that created by the Patriot Act. There is nothing more abhorrent, repugnant, repulsive, contradictory, viol, dangerous, or a complete abandonment of even the presence of a Republic, of a constitutional government, of the concept of rights, or the most basic tenets of liberty and individual freedom, than that contained in the Patriot Act.

Never has such a collection of illegal searches, data mining, and use of technology, to document and catalog every action, every facet, and every thought almost, of every American, on every form of communication, everywhere, been put together. This is way beyond unconstitutional, this is a massive crime syndicate within the federal government, and used by the entire federal government, foreign governments, and our state and local governments, creating a condition where absolutely nothing is private. The government wants to know — and now can know — everything.

There is a bogus argument that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about. That assumes that the government will honor every protection in law, every protection and procedure in the Bill of Rights, that every judge, every prosecutor, and every bureaucrat, will follow all of the above, the laws, the regulations, and the policies, exactly, and no judge with hide exculpatory evidence, no prosecutor will lie or withhold anything from discovery, that there will be no judicial or prosecutorial misconduct, that perjury by government officials will never happen, that juries will have full access to all the evidence, and all the witnesses, and can ask questions of all of them, that the jurors are informed of their rights and powers to nullify laws and judges instructions, that no government witness will be coerced or influenced to give certain testimony in exchange for favors, or to prevent punishment, and that no defendant will be badgered, beaten down, and extorted, to cop a plea for lesser charges that they know they never did, so as not to be charged with major felonies that they never did. So if you can guarantee that all of the above will be absolutely true all the time, then you can trust the system, and you probably have nothing to worry about if you didn’t do anything.

However, we know that’s not true. We know it was the government who gassed, murdered and bulldozed the bodies of the Branch Davidians into the ground in Waco. Were they protected by the system? No. We know it was the government that stole the 2020 Election, imposed an illegal Coup d’Etat on this nation for four years, and continues to have a Deep State, secret shadow government, doing everything possible to stop President Trump, now in 2025 with a federal judicial tyranny. And we know that the federal government mandated masks that don’t work, a Covid shot that is often fatal, which also comes with crippling life changing injuries, and probably will end up killing or injuring untold millions of citizens before it’s over. Yet they said the Covid shot was safe and effective, when it wasn’t, and that all their mandates were necessary and legal, which they were most certainly not.

It for all these reasons that we have a Bill of Rights, where over half of it concerns the rights of the accused, because all power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The Patriot Act is the closest thing to absolute power for the Deep State, and it must be reversed. That is what this bill is for. To return the US Code of Laws to a pre-Patriot Act state, before the domestic spying facilitation of the Deep State “Patriot Act.”

Terrorism is used to justify every violation of our rights, and to remove any controls on the government. Terrorism is a crime, a very bad crime, but nonetheless, a crime. So is murder, so is drug pushing fentanyl, so is rape, kidnapping, extortion, gang violence, racketeering, mafia crime families, home invasion, mass public shootings, political assassination, blackmail, embezzlement, fraud, and more, and we don’t abandon the Bill of Rights or the Constitution for any of those other crimes, so why does the Patriot Act try to use terrorism to obliterate every protection guaranteed citizens of the United States? Granted Congress was fully capitalizing on the attack on the World Trade Center, since the Patriot Act was passed only six weeks later, meaning it had to have been written way before 9/11, where the Deep State was just waiting, or causing, the right crisis in which to get this passed quickly, and without any study or question. That would have been “unpatriotic.” Tons of evidence suggests the government knew in advance of the 9/11 attack, let it happen, and may have facilitated the demolishing of two towers with demolition charges to bring the big towers down, also including WTC Building #7, which came down the same way, but was never hit by an airplane. “Never let a crisis go to waste,” Rahm Emanuel. Hmmm…

The point of this bill is to take out every codicil in the US Code put in by the Patriot Act, that allows exceptions, special treatment, waiver of any rights or protections, individual or mass data collection, surveillance, or anything that treats US citizens differently for investigations and gathering information of any kind, which uses the category of terrorism as the excuse or pretense to violate any right or protection afforded US citizens, which would be in place in the investigation of any other crime. Also, if the exception in law suspending rights is simply stating something is related to terrorism, where it may or may not, probably not, they just want the investigation, this is yet a further violation of constitutional rights and protections. All rights are: individual, absolute, and permanent.

Therefore, in order to restore constitutional rights and protections for US citizens, those parts of the Patriot Act taking away those rights and protections must be nullified, revoked, abolished, prevented from ever coming back, it’s programs defunded and dismantled, and all such language associated with the Patriot Act in the US Code, removed, reversed, and restored to it’s pre-Patriot Act language, as of the year 2000.

Once the US Code is restored to a pre-Patriot Act state, then Congress can more systematically, individually, and with more consideration of rights, change whatever Titles, Chapters, Sections and Parts of the US Code of Laws, that genuinely need changing as the times change, so that the law is always current with the times.

Restoring the U.S. Code to Before the Patriot Act:

Title 15 — COMMERCE AND TRADE

15 U.S. Code § 78u – Investigations and actions (h) and all subparts of (h)

Amendment: Facilitated cooperation between the SEC and law enforcement for investigations related to terrorist financing.

Abolished. This section violates all laws protecting privacy, private records, due process, search warrants and more.

15 U.S. Code § 1681v – Disclosures to governmental agencies for counterterrorism purposes

Amendment: Added new section allowing credit reporting agencies to disclose consumer reports to government agencies for terrorism investigations

Abolished. Pre-Patriot Act Status: This section did not exist before the Patriot Act. It was newly added to allow credit reporting agencies to disclose U.S. citizens’ credit reports for terrorism investigations without judicial oversight.

Title 18 — CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

18 U.S. Code § 981 – Civil forfeiture, Section (a)(1)(G) All assets, foreign or domestic—

Amendment: Expanded forfeiture authority for terrorism-related offenses and money laundering. (Patriot Act Section 806).

Abolished. Full asset seizure, no due process, no appeal, no warrants, no convictions, and no limits on what can be considered terrorism either foreign or domestic.

18 U.S. Code § 983 – General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings

Amendment: Modified procedures to streamline forfeiture for terrorism-related assets. (Patriot Act Section 806).

Abolished. Same reasons as § 981.

18 U.S. Code § 2331 – Definitions (5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that—

Amendment: Redefined “domestic terrorism” to include acts of mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. (Patriot Act Section 802).

Abolished. This is because of the tendency of Leftist Administrations to label anyone they don’t like or who oppose their agenda as “domestic terrorists.” This whole section should be rewritten and the terms redefined.

18 U.S. Code 2332a – Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Amendment: Added conspiracy provisions and expanded scope. (Patriot Act Section 811).

Abolished. Makes virtually anything a crime, including things affecting commerce, the mail system, for only perceived risks or threats, worldwide, jurisdiction over all “co-conspirators,” no probation or concurrent prison terms, and of course, no due process or rights.

18 U.S.C. § 2332b – Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries:

Description: This section expands the definition of terrorism-related crimes to include acts within the U.S. that “transcend national boundaries” (e.g., using interstate communications or facilities). It allows prosecution of U.S. citizens for vaguely defined acts that could be interpreted as terrorism. (Patriot Act Section 809).

Application to Domestic Spying/Prosecution: The broad language can criminalize activities like online speech or financial transactions if deemed to have an international nexus, lowering the threshold for investigating citizens without clear evidence.

Controversy: The ACLU has noted that this provision risks targeting protected activities (e.g., political speech) under the guise of terrorism, especially when paired with “material support” statutes.

Abolished. This is because it defines “federal crime of terrorism,” in vague terms that could apply to citizens’ lawful activities.

18 U.S. Code § 2339 – Harboring or concealing terrorists.

Description: Section 2339A (Patriot Act Section 805) expands “material support” to include “expert advice or assistance” and other vague categories. Section 2339B (Patriot Act Section 805) criminalizes support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, even without intent to further terrorism.

Application to Domestic Spying/Prosecution: These provisions allow prosecution of U.S. citizens for activities like donating to charities or providing legal advice if linked to a designated group, often without clear evidence of terrorist intent. They’ve been used to justify surveillance of citizens’ associations and speech.

Controversy: The Supreme Court (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 2010) upheld these provisions, but critics like the ACLU argue they chill First Amendment rights by targeting vague “support” without due process.

Parts (a) and (b) are abolished and deleted for describing reasonable grounds for arresting citizens for crimes they have not committed but might sometime in the future maybe. This is unconstitutional, and puts this law in the same category as unconstitutional red flag gun laws.

Pre-Patriot Act Language shall be restored to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. All other language is deleted, except the new section (c) below.

18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists

(a) Offense.— Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 37, 81, 175, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, or 2332b of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502 or 60123(b) of title 49, or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.(b) Definition.— As used in this section, the term “material support or resources” means currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such violations.

There shall be added a new section (c):

(c) Nothing in this section shall protect or make immune from prosecution any government employee, federal agency, department, non-governmental organization, public interest law firm, or other entity, including those otherwise protected by sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, or any other statutory or common law immunity, for knowingly or intentionally providing material support or resources in violation of this section, whether acting in an official capacity or otherwise. Such entities and individuals shall be subject to the same fines, penalties, prison terms, and asset forfeiture as other persons under this section,

18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations

(a) Prohibited activities.— Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(b) Definition.— As used in this section, the term “material support or resources” has the same meaning given that term in section 2339A of this title.

(1) In general.— The Secretary of State may designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds that—

(A) the organization is a foreign organization;

(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act); and

(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.

(2) Procedure.—

(A) Notice.— Before designating an organization as a foreign terrorist organization under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall notify, by classified communication—

(i) the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;

(ii) the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate;

(iii) the members of the relevant committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate; and

(iv) the Secretary of the Treasury.

Such notification shall be provided 7 days in advance of the designation.

(B) Publication.— The Secretary shall publish the designation in the Federal Register 7 days after providing the notification under subparagraph (A).

(C) Effect of designation.— For purposes of this section, any designation under this subsection shall take effect upon publication under subparagraph (B).

(D) Duration of designation.— A designation under this subsection shall be effective for all purposes for a period of 2 years beginning on the effective date of the designation, unless revoked under paragraph (4). If a designation has not been revoked under such paragraph and is still in effect at the end of such period, the Secretary may redesignate the organization as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection.

(3) Record.— The Secretary shall create an administrative record to support the designation of an organization as a foreign terrorist organization under this subsection. Such record shall be treated as confidential by the Secretary, but the Secretary shall provide the organization an opportunity to review an unclassified summary of the record.

(4) Revocation.—

(A) In general.— The Secretary may revoke a designation made under paragraph (1) at any time.

(B) Procedure.—

(i) If the Secretary revokes a designation, the Secretary shall publish the revocation in the Federal Register.

(ii) Any revocation shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified.

(5) Judicial review.— Upon petition by an organization designated under this subsection, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall review the designation. Such review shall be based solely upon the administrative record, except that the Secretary may submit additional classified information for in camera and ex parte review by the court. The court may set aside the designation if the court finds that the designation is—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) based on a record that does not contain substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s findings; or

(6) Definitions.— As used in this subsection—

(A) the term “classified information” has the meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act;

(B) the term “national security” means the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States; and

(C) the term “relevant committees” means the Committees on the Judiciary, International Relations, and Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services of the Senate.

(d) Financial transactions.— Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly engages in a financial transaction with a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. For purposes of this subsection, the term “financial transaction” has the same meaning given that term in section 1956(c)(4) of this title.

18 U.S.C. § 2510. Definitions

Description: Amends definitions to include electronic communications (e.g., email, internet activity) in the scope of wiretap laws, allowing surveillance of U.S. citizens’ digital communications if deemed relevant to terrorism investigations. (Patriot Act Section 201).

Application to Domestic Spying: Broadens the types of communications that can be intercepted, including those of U.S. citizens, without requiring specific evidence of criminal activity. The inclusion of electronic communications enables monitoring of internet activity, emails, and phone calls.

Interpretation and Controversy: Critics, including the ACLU, argue that the vague definition of “relevant” allows sweeping surveillance of U.S. citizens not directly linked to terrorism. Edward Snowden’s 2013 leaks revealed that NSA programs like PRISM collected data on U.S. citizens’ communications under this authority.

18 U.S. Code § 2510 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 2510. Definitions

As used in this chapter—

(1) “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication, but such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;

(2) “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication;

(3) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States;

(4) “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device;

(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication other than—

(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties;

(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal;

(6) “person” means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation;

(7) “Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses;

(8) “contents”, when used with respect to any wire, electronic, or oral communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication;

(9) “Judge of competent jurisdiction” means—

(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and

(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, electronic, or oral communications;

(10) “communication common carrier” shall have the same meaning which is given the term “common carrier” by section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934;

(11) “aggrieved person” means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed;

(12) “electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include—

(A) any wire or oral communication;

(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;

(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;

(13) “user” means any person or entity who—

(a) uses an electronic communication service; and

(b) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use;

(14) “electronic communications system” means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications;

(15) “electronic communication service” means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications;

(16) “readily accessible to the general public” means, with respect to a radio communication, that such communication is not—

(a) scrambled or encrypted;

(b) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication;

(d) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, unless the communication is a tone only paging system communication; or

(e) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice communication by radio;

(17) “electronic storage” means—

(a) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and

(b) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication;

(18) “aural transfer” means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.

18 U.S. Code § 2511 – Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited

Description: Expands the list of predicate offenses for wiretaps to include terrorism-related crimes, allowing interception of U.S. citizens’ communications if linked to a terrorism investigation. (Patriot Act Section 201)

Application to Domestic Spying: Permits the government to intercept U.S. citizens’ phone calls, emails, and other communications without proving they are foreign agents, as long as the investigation involves terrorism. The lowered threshold (from “probable cause” to “relevant to an ongoing investigation”) increases the risk of targeting citizens.

Interpretation and Controversy: The Just Security source notes that this provision, combined with Section 206 (below), facilitated programs like Stellar Wind, which collected domestic communications data. The ACLU criticized its use for broad surveillance of citizens with minimal oversight.

Change by Patriot Act: Added terrorism-related offenses as predicate crimes for interception, lowered the standard to “relevant to an ongoing terrorism investigation,” and expanded applicability to electronic communications, reducing Fourth Amendment protections.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, removing terrorism-related predicate offenses and restoring the requirement for court orders based on probable cause of specific crimes (not “relevance”).

18 U.S. Code § 2511 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 2511. Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited

(1) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, any person who—

(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;

(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when—

(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or

(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or

(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or

(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States;

(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; or

(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;

shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).

(2) The following activities are not prohibited by this section:

(a) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks;

(b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception;

(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State;

(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception, if such interception is authorized by a court order or other lawful authority;

(e) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized by that Act;

(f) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;

(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for any person—

(i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;

(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted—

(I) by any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;

(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;

(III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or

(IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications system;

(iii) to engage in any conduct which—

(I) is prohibited by section 633 of the Communications Act of 1934; or

(II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;

(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or

(v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted;

(h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter—

(i) to use a pen register or trap and trace device (as those terms are defined for the purposes of chapter 206 (relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices) of this title); or

(ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service.

(3)

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.

(b) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the contents of any such communication—

(i) as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title;

(ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such communication;

(iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination;

(iv) which were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, to a law enforcement agency if such contents were obtained in the normal course of business of the service provider;

(v) to a law enforcement agency, if such contents were obtained through an interception authorized under section 2516 of this title; or

(vi) to a law enforcement agency, if such contents were obtained through an interception authorized under section 2518 of this title.

(4)

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection or in subsection (5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b) If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) of this subsection and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the offense under paragraph (a) is a communication that is not a wire or oral communication, then—

(i) if the communication is not an electronic communication that is a private communication, the offender shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and

(ii) if the communication is an electronic communication that is a private communication, the offender shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

(c) Conduct otherwise an offense under this subsection that consists of or relates to the interception of a satellite transmission that is not encrypted or scrambled and that is transmitted—

(i) to a broadcasting station for purposes of retransmission to the general public; or

(ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for redistribution to facilities open to the public, but not including data transmissions or telephone calls,

is not an offense under this subsection unless the conduct is for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain.

(5)

(a)

(i) If the communication is—

(A) a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing of that communication and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain; or

(B) a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain,

then the person who engages in such conduct shall be subject to suit by the Federal Government in a court of competent jurisdiction.

(ii) In an action under this subsection—

(A) if the violation of this chapter is a first offense for the person under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) and such person has not been found liable in a civil action under section 2520 of this title, the Federal Government shall be entitled to appropriate injunctive relief; and

(B) if the violation of this chapter is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) or such person has been found liable in any prior civil action under section 2520, the person shall be subject to a mandatory $500 civil fine.

(b) The court may use any means within its authority to enforce an injunction issued under paragraph (ii)(A), and shall impose a civil fine of not less than $500 for each violation of such an injunction.

18 U.S. Code § 2516 – Authorization for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications

Description: Adds terrorism-related offenses to the list of crimes for which wiretap orders can be issued, allowing surveillance of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism-related activities. (Patriot Act Section 201)

Application to Domestic Spying: Enables federal agencies to obtain court orders to monitor U.S. citizens’ communications without traditional criminal probable cause standards, focusing instead on national security.

Interpretation and Controversy: The broad scope of “terrorism-related” offenses can include activities like material support (vague under Section 2339A/B), potentially sweeping in U.S. citizens’ protected speech or associations.

Change by Patriot Act: Added terrorism-related offenses to the list of predicate crimes, easing authorization for wiretaps on U.S. citizens with a lower “relevance” standard.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, removing terrorism-related offenses from the predicate crime list and restoring high-level DOJ approval and probable cause requirements.

18 U.S. Code § 2516 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2516. Authorization for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications

(1) The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this title, an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided evidence of—

(a) any offense against the United States arising under—

(i) section 351 (violations with respect to congressional, Cabinet, or Supreme Court assassination, kidnaping, or assault);

(ii) section 793, 794, 798, or 1751 (violations with respect to espionage and related offenses, or Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnaping, or assault);

(iii) section 1201 (kidnaping);

(iv) section 1203 (hostage taking);

(v) section 175 (biological weapons);

(vi) section 2280 (violence against maritime navigation);

(vii) section 2281 (violence against maritime fixed platforms);

(viii) section 2332 (terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals);

(ix) section 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction);

(x) section 2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries);

(xi) section 46502 (aircraft piracy) or section 60123(b) (destruction of interstate gas pipeline facility) of title 49;

(xii) section 2340A (torture); or

(xiii) section 37 (violence at international airports);

(b) any offense against the United States under—

(i) section 81 (arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction);

(ii) section 215 (bribery of bank officials);

(iii) section 471, 472, or 473 (counterfeiting);

(iv) section 659 (theft from interstate shipment) if the offense is felonious;

(v) section 664 (theft from employee benefit plans);

(vi) section 891–894 (extortionate credit transactions);

(vii) section 1029 (access device fraud);

(viii) section 1084 (transmission of gambling information);

(ix) section 1341 (mail fraud) or section 1343 (wire fraud) if the offense is felonious;

(x) section 1425, 1426, or 1427 (procurement, reproduction, or sale of citizenship or naturalization papers);

(xi) section 1503 (influencing or injuring officer or juror);

(xii) section 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations);

(xiii) section 1511 (obstruction of State or local law enforcement);

(xiv) section 1512 (tampering with a witness, victim, or informant);

(xv) section 1513 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant);

(xvi) section 1542, 1544, or 1546 (passport or visa fraud);

(xvii) section 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence);

(xviii) section 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises);

(xix) section 1956 (money laundering);

(xx) section 1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity);

(xxi) section 1962 or 1963 (racketeering activity under RICO);

(xxii) section 2312 or 2313 (interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles or property);

(xxiii) section 2314 or 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property or receipt thereof);

(xxiv) section 2319 (copyright infringement) if the offense is felonious;

(xxv) section 2320 (trafficking in counterfeit goods or services);

(xxvi) sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, or 2253 (sexual exploitation of children);

(xxvii) sections 2421–2424 (white slave traffic); or

(xxviii) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses;

(c) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (Bankruptcy Code) or the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;

(d) any offense including extortionate credit transactions under sections 892, 893, or 894 of this title; or

(e) any felony under the laws of the United States if the offense is committed in the course of or in furtherance of any offense described in this paragraph;

provided, however, that no application for an order approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall be authorized unless the agency making the application has responsibility for investigating the offense and the interception is otherwise permitted by law.

(2)

18 U.S. Code § 2517 – Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications

Description: Allows sharing of intercepted communications, including those of U.S. citizens, with other federal agencies for foreign intelligence or counterterrorism purposes. (Patriot Act Section 203)

Application to Domestic Spying: Permits data collected on U.S. citizens to be shared across agencies (e.g., FBI to NSA), increasing the risk of misuse in domestic investigations unrelated to terrorism.

Interpretation and Controversy: The Guardian notes that this provision enabled NSA’s bulk data sharing with other agencies, often without clear limits, affecting U.S. citizens’ privacy.

Change by Patriot Act: Allowed broader sharing of intercepted communications (including electronic) with other agencies for foreign intelligence or terrorism purposes, even beyond the original investigation.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, limiting disclosure to the specific criminal investigation authorized, prohibiting broad sharing for terrorism or intelligence purposes.

18 U.S. Code § 2517 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section, except the new section (6).

18 U.S.C. § 2517. Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications

(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.

(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any information concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdivision thereof.

(4) No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.

(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used under subsection (3) of this section when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable.

Adding a new section on government liability:

18 U.S.C. § 2517(6) Nothing in this section shall protect or make immune from prosecution any government employee, federal agency, department, non-governmental organization, public interest law firm, or other entity, including those otherwise protected by sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, or any other statutory or common law immunity, for knowingly or intentionally violating any provision of this section, whether acting in an official capacity or otherwise. Such entities and individuals shall be subject to the same fines, penalties, prison terms, and asset forfeiture as other persons under this chapter.

18 U.S. Code § 2518 – Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.

This whole section should be rewritten with the Constitution, Bill of Rights, due process, search and seizure, presumption of innocence, signed search warrants, and notification and consent provisions to those whose wire, oral or electronic communications are being intercepted, all provided for. (Patriot Act Section 201)

18 U.S. Code § 2518 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2518. Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications

(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such application. Each application shall include the following information:

(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the application;

(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection (11), a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;

(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;

(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;

(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such application; and

(f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.

(2) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application.

(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device authorized by a Federal judge within such jurisdiction), if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that—

(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this title;

(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;

(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;

(d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.

(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall specify—

(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;

(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;

(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;

(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and

(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.

An order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such service provider, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. Any provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities or assistance.

(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. Such thirty-day period begins on the earlier of the day on which the investigative or law enforcement officer first begins to conduct an interception under the order or ten days after the order is entered. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section. The period of extension shall be no longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days. In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. An order or extension under this section may authorize the interception of communications received or sent by a facility or at a place, or by a person whose communications are to be intercepted, after the facility, place, or person is identified, provided that such interception shall not begin until the facility, place, or person is identified and the authorization is amended to reflect such identification, unless the court finds that such amendment is not feasible due to exigent circumstances, in which case such amendment shall be made as soon as practicable.

(6) Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require.

(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, specially designated by the Attorney General, who reasonably determines that—

(a) an emergency situation exists that involves—

(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person;

(ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest; or

(iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime;

that requires a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can be obtained, and

(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this chapter to authorize such interception,

may intercept such wire, oral, or electronic communication if an application for an order approving the interception is made in accordance with this section within forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur. In the absence of an order, such interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event such application for an order is denied, or in any case where the interception is terminated without an order having been issued, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter, except that such contents may be used, if otherwise lawfully obtained, in any criminal proceeding to the extent necessary to protect the life or safety of any person.

(8) The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing judge and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations. The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517.

(9) The contents of any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with such information ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving such information.

(10)

(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that—

(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;

(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or

(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.

Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. The judge, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, may in his discretion make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the interests of justice.

(b) In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States shall have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress made under paragraph (a) of this subsection, or the denial of an application for an order of authorization, if the United States attorney certifies to the judge or other official granting such motion or denying such application that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty days after the date the order was entered and shall be diligently prosecuted.

(c) The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter with respect to the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving such communications.

(11) The requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this section relating to the specification of the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted do not apply if—

(a) in the case of an application with respect to the interception of an oral communication—

(i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General;

(ii) the application contains a full and complete statement as to why such specification is not practical and identifies the person committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; and

(iii) the judge finds that such specification is not practical; and

(b) in the case of an application with respect to a wire or electronic communication—

(ii) the application identifies the person believed to be committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted and the applicant makes a showing of a purpose, on the part of that person, to thwart interception by changing facilities; and

(iii) the judge finds that such purpose has been adequately shown.

(12) An interception of a communication under an order with respect to which the requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this section do not apply by reason of subsection (11) shall not begin until the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted is ascertained by the person implementing the interception order. A provider of wire or electronic communication service that has been provided with an order entered pursuant to subsection (11) shall not be responsible for identifying the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted, unless the order specifically requires such provider to ascertain such facilities or place.

(13) The requirements of subsection (1)(b)(iii) and (iv) of this section relating to a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted and the identity of the person whose communications are to be intercepted do not apply if—

(a) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General;

(b) the application contains a full and complete statement as to why such description or identification is not practical and identifies the offense being investigated; and

18 U.S. Code § 2520 – Recovery of civil damages authorized.

Should be rewritten as to actually allow for the recovery of all parties, without restriction, including the United States as a party or any subdivision, persons or individuals part of the federal government. Particularly egregious is (d) Defense.—A good faith reliance on—, for good faith is never a rationalization for illegal actions. (Patriot Act Section 201).

18 U.S. Code § 2520 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2520. Recovery of civil damages authorized

(a) In general.—Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.

(b) Relief.—In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes—

(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;

(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and

(3) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

(1) In an action under this section, if the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing of a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication is a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain, then the court shall assess damages as follows:

(A) If the person who engaged in that conduct has not previously been enjoined under section 2511(5) and has not been found liable in a prior civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.

(B) If, on one prior occasion, the person who engaged in that conduct has been enjoined under section 2511(5) or has been found liable in a civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.

(2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of—

(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or

(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000.

(d) Defense.—A good faith reliance on—

(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;

(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or

(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) permitted the conduct complained of;

is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.

(e) Limitation.—A civil action under this section may not be commenced later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.

18 U.S. Code § 2702 – Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records

Description: Allows service providers to voluntarily disclose U.S. citizens’ communications (e.g., emails, call logs) to law enforcement if they believe there is a risk to life or serious injury, including terrorism scenarios. (Patriot Act Section 212).

Application to Domestic Spying: Enables access to U.S. citizens’ stored emails and phone records without a warrant, as providers can disclose data based on vague “emergency” criteria.

Interpretation and Controversy: The ACLU highlighted that this provision lacks judicial oversight, allowing broad access to citizens’ data. It was used to obtain email and internet records of U.S. citizens in terrorism probes, often without their knowledge.

Change by Patriot Act: Added exceptions allowing voluntary disclosure in emergencies (e.g., terrorism risks) without warrants or consent, reducing privacy protections.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, removing emergency disclosure exceptions and restoring warrant or consent requirements.

18 U.S. Code § 2702 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2702. Disclosure of contents

(a) Prohibitions.—Except as provided in subsection (b)—

(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and

(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service—

(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such service; and

(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing.

(b) Exceptions.—A person or entity may divulge the contents of a communication—

(1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient;

(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of this title;

(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;

(4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination;

(5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service; or

(6) to a law enforcement agency, if such contents—

(A) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and

(B) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime.

18 U.S. Code § 2703 – Required disclosure of customer communications or records

Description: Expands the scope of records (e.g., phone numbers dialed, email metadata, payment information) that can be obtained via subpoena or court order, including for U.S. citizens. (Patriot Act Section 210)

Application to Domestic Spying: Allows the FBI to access U.S. citizens’ communication records (e.g., call logs, internet activity) with a lower threshold than a warrant, often without notifying the individual.

Interpretation and Controversy: Snowden’s leaks showed that this provision supported NSA’s bulk metadata collection, capturing U.S. citizens’ phone and internet records en masse, as reported by the Guardian.

Change by Patriot Act: Expanded the scope of obtainable records (e.g., metadata, payment info) and allowed access via subpoena or court order with a “relevance” standard, bypassing warrants.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, restoring warrant requirements and limiting the scope of obtainable records to pre-2001 standards.

18 U.S. Code § 2703 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2703. Requirements for governmental access

(a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic storage.—A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of an electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant.

(b) Contents of electronic communications in a remote computing service.—

(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection—

(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant; or

(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity—

(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or

(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;

except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.

(2) Paragraph (1) is applicable to any electronic communication that is held or maintained on a remote computing service—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service may disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to any person other than a governmental entity.

(2) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section only when the governmental entity—

(A) obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant;

(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; or

(3) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose to a governmental entity the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized, when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(d) Requirements for court order.—A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) of this section may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction described in section 3127(2)(A) of this title and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.

(e) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under this chapter.—No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, warrant, subpoena, or certification under this chapter.

(f) Requirement to preserve evidence.—

(1) A provider of wire or electronic communication service or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.

(2) Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity.

18 U.S. Code § 2707 – Civil action.

This section should be rewritten so that citizens can take civil action against the United States, any private corporation, NGO, or any other entity, without limitation or time limits, where all cases shall go before a jury of one’s peers for relief. (Patriot Act Section 223).

18 U.S. Code § 2707 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2707. Civil action

(a) Cause of Action.—Except as provided in section 2703(e), any provider of electronic communication service, subscriber, or customer aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.

(b) Relief.—In a civil action under this section, appropriate relief includes—

(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;

(2) damages under subsection (c); and

(3) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

(c) Damages.—The court may assess as damages in a civil action under this section the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000.

(d) Defense.—A good faith reliance on—

(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;

(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or

(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;

is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.

(e) Limitation.—A civil action under this section may not be commenced later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first discovered or had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.

18 U.S. Code § 2709 – Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records

Description: Expands the FBI’s authority to issue National Security Letters (NSLs) to obtain U.S. citizens’ communication records (e.g., phone, internet, financial records) without judicial approval, often with gag orders preventing disclosure. (Patriot Act Section 505).

Application to Domestic Spying: NSLs can target U.S. citizens’ records if deemed relevant to a terrorism or counterintelligence investigation, with no requirement to show direct involvement in terrorism. The ACLU reported that over 192,000 NSLs were issued from 2003–2006, many targeting U.S. citizens.

Interpretation and Controversy: The ACLU and Just Security sources criticize NSLs for their lack of oversight and broad application to U.S. citizens, including cases where libraries and internet providers were compelled to turn over records. The gag orders prevent public awareness, and Snowden’s leaks confirmed NSLs were used in bulk data collection programs.

Change by Patriot Act: Strengthened subsection (c) to formalize gag orders, preventing providers from notifying U.S. citizens of NSL requests. Expanded NSLs to terrorism investigations, lowered the standard to “relevance” without requiring specific facts about foreign powers, reduced certification levels, and formalized gag orders.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language below, limiting NSLs to foreign counterintelligence, restoring “specific and articulable facts” requirements, and removing subsection (c) to eliminate gag orders.

18 U.S. Code § 2709 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 2709. Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records

(a) Duty to provide.—A wire or electronic communication service provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Required certification.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may—

(1) request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is made that—

(A) the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are relevant to an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and

(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801); and

(2) request the name, address, and length of service of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is made that—

(A) the information sought is relevant to an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and

(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that communication facilities registered in the name of the person or entity have been used, through the services of such provider, in communication with—

(i) an individual who is engaging or has engaged in international terrorism as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; or

(ii) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power under circumstances giving reason to believe that the communication concerned international terrorism as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.

(c) Prohibition of certain disclosure.—No wire or electronic communication service provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this section.

(d) Dissemination by Bureau.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate information and records obtained under this section only as provided in guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United States, only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.

(e) Requirement that certain congressional bodies be informed.—On a semiannual basis the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, concerning all requests made under subsection (b) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 3121 – General Prohibition on Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Use; Exception

Description: Expands authority to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to capture U.S. citizens’ phone and internet metadata (e.g., numbers dialed, email recipients) for terrorism investigations, with a lower standard of “relevance” rather than probable cause. (Patriot Act Section 214).

Application to Domestic Spying: Facilitates monitoring of U.S. citizens’ communications across state lines, with minimal judicial oversight.

Interpretation and Controversy: Critics argue this provision enables dragnet surveillance, as seen in NSA programs revealed by Snowden, where citizens’ metadata was collected without specific suspicion.

Change by Patriot Act: Lowered the standard to “relevance” for terrorism investigations, expanded to electronic communications, and allowed broader use without specific criminal evidence.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, restoring the requirement for specific criminal evidence and limiting to traditional phone communications.

18 U.S. Code § 3121 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 3121. General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device use; exception

(a) In general.—Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title or under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

(b) Exception.—The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communication service—

(1) relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic communication service or to the protection of the rights or property of such provider, or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; or

(2) to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service; or

(3) where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.

(c) Penalty.—Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

18 U.S. Code § 3123 – Issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device

Description: Allows nationwide jurisdiction for pen register orders, simplifying surveillance of U.S. citizens across jurisdictions. (Patriot Act Section 214).

Change by Patriot Act: Allowed nationwide jurisdiction and applied the “relevance” standard to terrorism investigations, reducing oversight.

Application to Domestic Spying: Facilitates monitoring of U.S. citizens’ communications across state lines, with minimal judicial oversight.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, limiting jurisdiction to specific courts and requiring specific criminal investigation ties.

18 U.S. Code § 3123 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

18 U.S.C. § 3123. Issuance of an order for a pen register or trap and trace device

(a) In general.—Upon an application made under section 3122 of this title, the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court, if the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.

(b) Contents of order.—An order issued under this section—

(1) shall specify—

(A) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached;

(B) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation;

(C) the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order; and

(D) a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates; and

(2) shall direct, upon the request of the applicant, the furnishing of information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device under section 3124 of this title.

(1) An order issued under this section shall authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed sixty days.

(2) Extensions of such an order may be granted, but only upon an application for an order under section 3122 of this title and upon the judicial finding required by subsection (a) of this section. The period of extension shall be for a period not to exceed sixty days.

(d) Nondisclosure of existence of pen register or trap and trace device.—An order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct that—

(1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and

(2) the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or a trap and trace device is attached, or who has been ordered by the court to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the court.

18 U.S.C. § 3125. Emergency pen register and trap and trace device installation

18 U.S. Code § 3125 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section. (Patriot Act Section 214).

18 U.S.C. § 3125. Emergency pen register and trap and trace device installation

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that—

(1) an emergency situation exists that involves—

(A) immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(B) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,

that requires the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device before an order authorizing such installation and use can, with due diligence, be obtained, and

(2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this chapter to authorize such installation and use;

may have installed and use a pen register or trap and trace device if, within forty-eight hours after the installation has occurred, or begins to occur, an order approving the installation or use is issued in accordance with section 3123 of this title.

(b) In the absence of an authorizing order, such use shall immediately terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied or when forty-eight hours have lapsed since the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device, whichever is earlier.

(c) The knowing installation or use by any investigative or law enforcement officer of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to subsection (a) without application for the authorizing order within forty-eight hours of the installation shall constitute a violation of this chapter.

(d) A provider of a wire or electronic service, landlord, custodian, or other person who furnished facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably compensated for such reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities and assistance.

Title 31 — MONEY AND FINANCE

31 U.S. Code § 5318 – Compliance, exemptions, and summons authority

Compliance, Exemptions, and Summons Authority (Patriot Act Sections 311, 312, 326)

Description: Mandates anti-money laundering (AML) programs and enhanced due diligence for correspondent accounts, enforced by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

Potential Hidden Funding: FinCEN’s operations, including its highly secure network for tracking terrorist financing (Patriot Act Section 362), may involve classified funding. The FinCEN.gov source notes that Section 314 (cooperative efforts to deter money laundering) involves information sharing with intelligence agencies, which could be funded through black budget allocations to the Treasury or intelligence community. Classified programs to monitor foreign bank accounts or shell companies may not be publicly disclosed.

31 U.S. Code § 5318 – Abolished and deleted.

31 U.S. Code § 5332 – Bulk Cash Smuggling (Patriot Act Section 371)

Description: Criminalizes bulk cash smuggling to fund terrorism, enforced by Treasury and DOJ.

Potential Hidden Funding: Investigations into international terrorist financing may involve covert operations by the CIA or Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, funded through black budgets. The Washington Post mentions CIA covert action programs ($2.6 billion in 2013), which could include tracking terrorist financing enabled by Patriot Act provisions, with no public or congressional transparency.

Why Hidden?: The Treasury’s intelligence activities, including FinCEN’s collaboration with the CIA and NSA, often fall under classified budgets. The Columbia International Affairs Online source notes that black budgets fund covert financial operations, which could support Patriot Act mandates without public disclosure.

31 U.S. Code § 5332 – Abolished and deleted.

Title 42 — THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

42 U.S. Code § 2000ee – Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (Patriot Act Section 1061)

Description: Establishes a board to oversee Patriot Act implementation and protect civil liberties.

Potential Hidden Funding: While the board itself is publicly funded, its investigations into classified programs (e.g., NSA’s Stellar Wind) may involve access to black budget details, which are not disclosed. The Just Security source notes that Stellar Wind, authorized post-9/11, was funded outside Patriot Act appropriations but supported its surveillance goals, suggesting overlap with classified budgets.

Why Hidden?: The board’s access to classified programs implies indirect involvement with black budget-funded activities, but specific funding details remain opaque due to national security classifications.

42 U.S. Code § 2000ee – Abolished and deleted.

General information on hidden or black budgets:

Evidence of Secrecy and Black Budget Connections

Black Budget Overview: The Washington Post (2013) revealed a $52.6 billion black budget for the National Intelligence Program, covering 16 spy agencies, including NSA, CIA, and NRO. This budget funds programs like PRISM and Stellar Wind, which were enabled or expanded by Patriot Act provisions (e.g., Sections 215 and 206). These programs are not publicly itemized, and even Congress (outside Intelligence Committees) lacks full access.

Historical Context: Tim Weiner’s Blank Check and the Wired article describe black budgets funding secret programs (e.g., spy satellites, covert operations) with minimal oversight. The Patriot Act’s surveillance and counterterrorism provisions likely leverage these existing mechanisms, with funding buried in classified line items.

Congressional Complaints: Senator Ron Wyden (2011) and Representatives Welch and Lummis (2014) criticized the lack of transparency in intelligence budgets, noting that most Congress members cannot access funding details for agencies implementing Patriot Act provisions. The Welch.house.gov source highlights the Intelligence Budget Transparency Act, which sought to disclose top-line budgets but did not address specific Patriot Act funding.

Snowden Revelations: Edward Snowden’s leaks (2013) exposed NSA’s bulk data collection under Section 215, funded through black budgets. The Guardian notes that these programs were hidden from public and congressional scrutiny, with funding details only available to select committees.

ACLU Concerns: The ACLU (2004, 2005) criticized the secrecy of Patriot Act implementation, particularly NSLs and Section 215, noting that the public and Congress cannot assess misuse due to classified operations. This implies potential black budget funding for related surveillance infrastructure.

Critical Examination of the Establishment Narrative

The official narrative, as presented by the DOJ and Congress, is that the Patriot Act is funded through transparent appropriations (e.g., DOJ budgets for FBI operations, Treasury budgets for FinCEN). However, this narrative obscures several issues:

Lack of Oversight: As noted by Wyden and the ACLU, the secrecy surrounding surveillance programs (e.g., Stellar Wind, PRISM) means that funding details are often classified, even from Congress. The Washington Post confirms that black budgets hide specific allocations, undermining claims of transparency.

Misuse of Existing Budgets: The Columbia International Affairs Online source suggests that black budgets, like the Exchange Stabilization Fund, can be repurposed for covert operations, potentially including Patriot Act-related activities, without public or congressional knowledge.

Post-9/11 Secrecy Surge: The Just Security article notes that the Patriot Act was rushed through Congress with little debate, incorporating pre-existing FBI wish lists (e.g., delayed-notice searches) that align with classified programs. This suggests that funding for these programs may have been pre-existing in black budgets, repurposed post-9/11 without public disclosure.

Potential for Abuse: The ACLU and Guardian sources highlight that the Patriot Act’s vague language (e.g., “relevant to an investigation”) allows agencies to stretch funding into classified areas (e.g., NSA’s internet surveillance), which are not publicly accounted for. This raises the possibility of hidden funding streams not explicitly tied to the Patriot Act but used for its implementation.

Specific Black Budget Items (Speculative Due to Secrecy)

While no source directly names black budget items explicitly funding the Patriot Act, the following are plausible candidates based on the Act’s provisions and known black budget practices:

NSA’s PRISM and Stellar Wind Programs:

Link to Patriot Act: Enabled by Sections 215 and 206, these programs collected bulk metadata and conducted roving surveillance.

Funding: The Washington Post (2013) reports $2.5 billion for NSA’s data collection and $2.6 billion for covert actions, likely including Patriot Act-related surveillance. These funds are classified and not disclosed to the public or most of Congress.

Secrecy: Snowden’s leaks revealed these programs were hidden, with funding details only accessible to Intelligence Committees.

CIA Covert Operations:

Link to Patriot Act: Sections 2339A/B (material support) and 2332b (cross-border terrorism) support CIA operations against terrorist networks.

Funding: The Washington Post notes $2.3 billion for CIA human intelligence and $68.6 million for operative “cover” in 2013, potentially funding Patriot Act-related missions. These are black budget items with no public breakdown.

Secrecy: CIA budgets are classified, and even Congress lacks full oversight, as noted by Welch.

FinCEN’s Secure Network:

Link to Patriot Act: Section 362 established a highly secure network for tracking terrorist financing.

Funding: Likely funded through Treasury’s classified intelligence budget, possibly overlapping with CIA or NSA allocations, as FinCEN collaborates with intelligence agencies.

Secrecy: The network’s development and operation costs are not publicly detailed, suggesting possible black budget involvement.

FBI’s NSL Infrastructure:

Link to Patriot Act: Section 505 expanded NSL authority for communication records.

Funding: The technological infrastructure (e.g., data storage, analysis) may be funded through classified FBI or NSA budgets, as the ACLU noted their secretive use in Las Vegas (2004).

Secrecy: NSL costs are not itemized in public DOJ budgets, suggesting possible black budget support.

Limitations and Challenges

Lack of Specific Evidence: No public source explicitly identifies black budget items funding the Patriot Act, as such details are classified. The Washington Post (2013) provides the most detailed breakdown of intelligence budgets but does not tie specific line items to the Patriot Act.

Secrecy by Design: As noted in Wired (1995) and Blank Check, black budgets are designed to evade public and congressional scrutiny, making it impossible to confirm specific Patriot Act funding without classified access.

Congressional Ignorance: The Welch.house.gov source indicates that most Congress members lack access to intelligence budget details, supporting the idea that Patriot Act-related funding could be hidden in classified line items.

Expired Provisions: Some Patriot Act provisions (e.g., Section 215) expired in 2020, as noted in Just Security, but ongoing investigations may still use black budget funding, complicating current assessments.

Conclusion

While no definitive list of secret, hidden, or black budget items specifically funding the USA PATRIOT Act exists in public records, the Act’s surveillance, intelligence, and counterterrorism provisions (e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1861, 2709; 31 U.S.C. § 5318) likely intersect with classified funding streams in the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program. Programs like NSA’s PRISM and Stellar Wind, CIA covert operations, and FinCEN’s secure network are plausible candidates for black budget funding, as they align with the Act’s goals and are documented in sources like the Washington Post as receiving billions in classified funds. The secrecy surrounding these budgets, as criticized by Wyden, Welch, and the ACLU, ensures that specific allocations remain hidden from the public, media, and most of Congress, with oversight limited to Intelligence Committees.

The lack of transparency, coupled with the Patriot Act’s rushed passage and vague language (as noted by Just Security and ACLU), suggests that funding for its implementation could be buried in classified budgets without public or full congressional knowledge.

Title 50 — WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

50 U.S.C. § 1801 – Definitions

Description: Expands definitions of “foreign intelligence information” to include information about U.S. citizens if relevant to terrorism investigations, broadening the scope of FISA surveillance. (Patriot Act Section 206)

Change by Patriot Act: Expanded “foreign intelligence information” to include U.S. citizens if relevant to terrorism, blurring foreign/domestic lines.

Impact on Domestic Spying: Enabled FISA surveillance of U.S. citizens without evidence of foreign agency, as seen in programs like Stellar Wind (Just Security).

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, limiting FISA surveillance to foreign powers or agents, excluding U.S. citizens without specific foreign ties.

50 U.S. Code § 1801 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

50 U.S.C. § 1801. Definitions

As used in this subchapter:

(a) “Foreign power” means—

(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States;

(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons;

(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;

(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;

(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; or

(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

(b) “Agent of a foreign power” means—

(1) any person other than a United States person, who—

(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;

(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or

(2) any person who—

(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;

(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;

(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; or

(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;

(2) appear to be intended—

(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

(d) “Sabotage” means activities that involve a violation of chapter 105 of Title 18, or that would involve such a violation if committed against the United States.

(e) “Foreign intelligence information” means—

(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against—

(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or

(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or

(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to—

(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or

(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

(f) “Electronic surveillance” means—

(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;

(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States;

(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States; or

(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.

(g) “Attorney General” means the Attorney General of the United States (or Acting Attorney General) or the Deputy Attorney General.

(h) “United States person” means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.

(i) “United States”, when used in a geographical sense, means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(j) “Aggrieved person” means a person who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to electronic surveillance.

(k) “Wire communication” means any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.

(l) “Contents”, when used with respect to a communication, includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.

(m) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.

50 U.S. Code § 1802 – Electronic surveillance authorization without court order; certification by Attorney General; reports to Congressional committees; transmittal under seal; duties and compensation of communication common carrier; applications; jurisdiction of court

As we all know a game is played where various intelligence agencies will want to spy on an American citizen, but they can’t just do that, so they get a FISA warrant to spy on a foreign national, who just happens to be associated with the American they really want to spy on. This is called a “work around.” It’s also illegal.

This section is abolished and deleted. It should be rewritten where the title is changed to, “Electronic surveillance authorization WITH court order…” And a new section in compliance with the Constitution, which prohibits “work arounds” is added here.

50 U.S. Code § 1804 – Applications for court orders

Description: Lowers the standard for FISA surveillance orders, requiring only that a “significant purpose” (rather than primary purpose) of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence, which can include U.S. citizens’ data. (Patriot Act Section 207)

Change by Patriot Act: Changing “the purpose” to “a significant purpose,” allows surveillance of U.S. citizens for terrorism without primary foreign intelligence goals.

Impact on Domestic Spying: Enabled FISA wiretaps on U.S. citizens with minimal foreign nexus, as criticized by EPIC for programs like PRISM. The ACLU and Guardian argue this provision allowed the NSA to target U.S. citizens’ communications under broad interpretations of “foreign intelligence,” as seen in PRISM and other programs.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, restoring “the purpose” requirement and ensuring surveillance targets foreign intelligence.

50 U.S. Code § 1804 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

50 U.S.C. § 1804. Applications for court orders

(a) Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance under this subchapter shall be made by a Federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title. Each application shall require the approval of the Attorney General based upon his finding that it satisfies the criteria and requirements of such application as set forth in this subchapter. It shall include—

(1) the identity of the Federal officer making the application;

(2) the authority conferred on the Attorney General by the President of the United States and the approval of the Attorney General to make the application;

(3) the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance;

(4) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that—

(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and

(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(5) a statement of the proposed minimization procedures;

(6) a description of the nature of the information sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance;

(7) a certification or certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in the area of national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate—

(A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information;

(B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information;

(D) that designates the type of foreign intelligence information being sought according to the categories described in section 1801(e) of this title; and

(E) including a statement of the basis for the certification that—

(i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information designated; and

(ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques;

(8) a statement of the means by which the surveillance will be effected and a statement whether physical entry is required to effect the surveillance;

(9) a statement of the facts concerning all previous applications that have been made to any judge under this subchapter involving any of the persons, facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken on each previous application;

(10) a statement of the period of time for which the electronic surveillance is required to be maintained, and if the nature of the intelligence gathering is such that the approval of the electronic surveillance should not automatically terminate when the described type of information has first been obtained, a description of facts supporting the belief that additional information of the same type will be obtained thereafter; and

(11) whenever more than one electronic, mechanical or other surveillance device is to be used with respect to a particular proposed electronic surveillance, the coverage of the devices involved and what minimization procedures apply to information acquired by each device.

(b) Whenever the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title, the requirements of subsection (a)(3) of this section shall not apply, unless the foreign power is an entity described in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments and the Attorney General determines that the electronic surveillance is directed at communications or information of United States persons.

(c) The Attorney General may require such other information in the application as may be necessary to permit the judge to make the determinations required by section 1805 of this title.

(d) The judge may require the applicant to furnish such additional information as may be necessary to make the determinations required by section 1805 of this title.

(e)

(1) Upon written request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review under subsection (a) of this section an application under that subsection for a target described in section 1801(b)(2) of this title.

(2) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make a request referred to in paragraph (1), an official referred to in that paragraph may, by written request, delegate the authority to make such a request to a subordinate official, who in the case of—

(A) the Secretary of Defense, shall be a civilian employee of the Department of Defense appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate;

(B) the Secretary of State, shall be a civilian employee of the Department of State appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; or

(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, shall be an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

50 U.S. Code § 1805 – Issuance of order

Description: Authorizes roving wiretaps under FISA, allowing surveillance of U.S. citizens across multiple devices or locations without specifying the target or facility, if linked to terrorism. (Patriot Act Section 206).

Pre-Patriot Act Safeguard: FISA wiretap orders required specification of the target’s identity and communication facilities, ensuring precise surveillance and protecting U.S. citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Potential Hidden Funding: Roving wiretaps and related surveillance technologies (e.g., intercept systems, data storage) may involve NSA programs funded through the National Intelligence Program (NIP) black budget. The 2013 Washington Post article notes a $52.6 billion black budget for 2013, covering NSA’s surveillance operations, which could include Patriot Act-enabled programs like Stellar Wind (NSA’s post-9/11 bulk data collection program). Funding for these systems is often buried in classified line items (e.g., “covert action programs” costing $2.6 billion in 2013) and not disclosed to the public or most of Congress. (Patriot Act Section 206)

Change by Patriot Act: Added roving wiretap authority, removing the need to specify facilities, and extended durations, allowing broader surveillance of U.S. citizens.

Impact on Domestic Spying: Enabled continuous monitoring of U.S. citizens’ communications without updating court orders, as used in NSA programs (Guardian). Enables continuous monitoring of U.S. citizens’ communications (e.g., phones, emails) without updating court orders for each device, increasing the scope of surveillance.

Interpretation and Controversy: The Just Security source highlights that roving wiretaps were used to monitor U.S. citizens’ communications without clear ties to terrorism, contributing to programs like Stellar Wind. Critics argue this provision erodes Fourth Amendment protections.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, requiring specific facility identification and removing roving wiretap provisions.

50 U.S. Code § 1805 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

50 U.S.C. § 1805. Issuance of order

(a) Upon an application made pursuant to section 1804 of this title, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified approving the electronic surveillance if he finds that—

(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve applications for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence information;

(2) the application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

(3) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is probable cause to believe that—

(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power: Provided, That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and

(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) of this title; and

(5) the application which has been filed contains all statements and certifications required by section 1804 of this title and, if the target is a United States person, the certification or certifications are not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statement made under section 1804(a)(7)(E) of this title and any other information furnished under section 1804(d) of this title.

(b) An order approving an electronic surveillance under this section shall—

(1) specify—

(A) the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance;

(B) the nature and location of each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will be directed;

(C) the type of information sought to be acquired and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance;

(D) the means by which the electronic surveillance will be effected and whether physical entry will be used to effect the surveillance;

(E) the period of time during which the electronic surveillance is approved; and

(F) whenever more than one electronic surveillance device is to be used under the order, the authorized coverage of the devices involved and what minimization procedures shall apply to information subject to acquisition by each device; and

(2) direct—

(A) that the minimization procedures be followed;

(B) that, upon the request of the applicant, a specified communication or other common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other specified person furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing that target of electronic surveillance;

(C) that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence any records concerning the surveillance or the aid furnished that such person wishes to retain; and

(D) that the applicant compensate, at the prevailing rate, such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person for furnishing such aid.

(c)

(1) An order issued under this section may approve an electronic surveillance for the period necessary to achieve its purpose, or for ninety days, whichever is less, except that an order under this section shall approve an electronic surveillance targeted against a foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title, for the period specified in the application or for one year, whichever is less.

(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon an application for an extension and new findings by the judge. An extension of an order under this section for a surveillance targeted against a foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a)(5) or (6) of this title, or against a foreign power as defined in section 1801(a)(4) of this title that is not an entity directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments, may be for the period specified in the application or for ninety days, whichever is less. An extension of an order under this section for a surveillance targeted against a foreign power as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title may be for the period specified in the application or for one year, whichever is less. An extension of an order under this section for a surveillance targeted against an agent of a foreign power who is not a United States person may be for the period specified in the application or for ninety days, whichever is less.

(3) At or before the end of the period of time for which electronic surveillance is approved by an order or an extension, or at any time after such surveillance is terminated, the judge may assess compliance with the minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.

(d)

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General reasonably determines that—

(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and

(B) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists;

he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and an application in accordance with this subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than twenty-four hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.

(2) If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency surveillance under paragraph (1), he shall require that the minimization procedures required by this subchapter for the issuance of a judicial order be followed.

(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of twenty-four hours from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest.

(4) In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

(5) A denial of the application made under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 1803 of this title.

(e) Applications made and orders granted under this subchapter shall be retained for a period of at least ten years.

(f) In circumstances involving the unintentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States, such contents shall be destroyed upon recognition, unless the Attorney General determines that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

(g) Information acquired from an electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to this subchapter concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States person only in accordance with the minimization procedures required by this subchapter. No information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to this subchapter may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes.

(h) No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General.

(i) Whenever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to so disclose or so use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used that the Government intends to so disclose or so use such information.

(j) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of a State or political subdivision thereof, against an aggrieved person any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the State or political subdivision thereof shall notify the aggrieved person, the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used, and the Attorney General that the State or political subdivision thereof intends to so disclose or so use such information.

(k)

(1) Any person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance authorized by this subchapter is to be, or has been, introduced or otherwise used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic surveillance on the grounds that—

(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or

(B) the surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval.

(2) Such a motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such a motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.

(l) Whenever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (i) or (j) of this section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (k) of this section, or whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any State to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to an electronic surveillance authorized by this subchapter or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance under this subchapter, the United States district court or, where the motion is made before another authority, the United States district court in the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.

(m) If the United States district court pursuant to subsection (l) of this section determines that the surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived from electronic surveillance of the aggrieved person or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person. If the court determines that the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure.

(n) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection (k) of this section, decisions under this section that electronic surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States district court under subsection (l) of this section shall be final orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the several States except a United States court of appeals and the Supreme Court.

(o) In addition to any other remedy available under this subchapter, an aggrieved person, other than a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in section 1801 of this title, who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 of this title may bring a civil action against the United States in a United States district court for such violation. Such action shall be brought within two years after the date the aggrieved person had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.

50 U.S. Code § 1806 – Use of information

Description: Allows FISA-acquired information about U.S. citizens to be shared with law enforcement for domestic investigations, including non-terrorism cases.

Pre-Patriot Act Safeguard: Limited use of FISA-acquired information to foreign intelligence purposes, prohibiting its use in domestic criminal investigations against U.S. citizens without strict oversight.

Application to Domestic Spying: Permits data collected on U.S. citizens under FISA to be used in domestic criminal probes, expanding the scope beyond terrorism.

Interpretation and Controversy: The Guardian notes that this provision facilitated data sharing in NSA’s bulk collection programs, impacting U.S. citizens’ privacy without their knowledge.

Change by Patriot Act: Allowed broader sharing of FISA data with law enforcement for domestic investigations, including non-terrorism cases.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, limiting use to foreign intelligence purposes and enforcing strict minimization procedures.

50 U.S. Code § 1806 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

50 U.S.C. § 1806. Use of information

(a) Information acquired from an electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to this subchapter concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States person only in accordance with the minimization procedures required by section 1801(h) of this title. No otherwise privileged information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to this subchapter shall lose its privileged character.

(b) No information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to this subchapter may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes.

(c) No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General.

(d) Whenever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to so disclose or so use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used that the Government intends to so disclose or so use such information.

(e) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of a State or a political subdivision thereof, against an aggrieved person any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the State or political subdivision thereof shall notify the aggrieved person, the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used, and the Attorney General that the State or political subdivision thereof intends to so disclose or so use such information.

(f) Any person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance to which he is an aggrieved person is to be, or has been, introduced or otherwise used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic surveillance on the grounds that—

(1) the information was unlawfully acquired; or

(2) the surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval.

Such a motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such a motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.

(g) Whenever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (d) or (e) of this section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, or whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any State to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to an electronic surveillance authorized by this subchapter or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance authorized by this subchapter, the United States district court or, where the motion is made before another authority, the United States district court in the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.

(h) If the United States district court pursuant to subsection (g) of this section determines that the surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived from electronic surveillance of the aggrieved person or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person. If the court determines that the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure.

(i) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection (f) of this section, decisions under this section that electronic surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States district court under subsection (g) of this section shall be final orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the several States except a United States court of appeals and the Supreme Court.

(j) In circumstances involving the unintentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States, such contents shall be destroyed upon recognition, unless the Attorney General determines that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

(k) Certifications made, applications made, and orders granted under this subchapter shall be retained for a period of at least ten years.

50 U.S. Code § 1842 – Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations

Description: Expands FISA authority to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to capture U.S. citizens’ communication metadata (e.g., email headers, phone numbers) in terrorism investigations.

Application to Domestic Spying: Allows real-time tracking of U.S. citizens’ communication patterns under FISA, with a lower standard than traditional criminal investigations. (Patriot Act Section 214)

Interpretation and Controversy: The Guardian notes that this provision supported NSA’s bulk metadata collection, capturing U.S. citizens’ data en masse, as revealed by Edward Snowden.

Change by Patriot Act: Lowered the standard to “relevance” for terrorism investigations, allowing metadata collection on U.S. citizens.

Restoration Action: Revert to the 2000 language, requiring foreign intelligence focus and specific facts about foreign powers.

50 U.S. Code § 1842 shall be amended by adding the original language below and deleting the rest of the section.

50 U.S.C. § 1842. Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations

(a) Application for authorization or approval.—

(1) The Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government may make an application for an order or an extension of an order under this section authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or information concerning international terrorism, conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 or a successor order.

(2) The application shall be in writing under oath or affirmation to—

(A) a court of competent jurisdiction established under section 1803 of this title; or

(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of Title 28, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to hear applications and grant orders for the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device on behalf of a court referred to in subparagraph (A).

(3) An application under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) the identity of the Federal officer making the application; and

(B) a certification by the applicant that—

(i) the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person; or

(ii) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in section 1801 of this title.

(b) Issuance of order.—

(1) Upon an application under subsection (a), the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the application satisfies the requirements of such subsection.

(2) An order issued under this section—

(A) shall specify—

(i) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached;

(ii) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the investigation;

(iii) the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order; and

(iv) a statement of the activities to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates;

(B) shall direct that—

(i) upon request of the applicant, the provider of a wire or electronic communication service furnish any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such provider is providing to the target;

(ii) such provider maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace device or the aid furnished; and

(iii) the applicant compensate, at the prevailing rate, such provider for furnishing such aid; and

(C) may direct the provider to refrain from disclosing the existence of the order to any person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(1) An order issued under this section shall authorize the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for a period not to exceed 90 days.

(2) Extensions of an order issued under this section may be granted, but only upon an application for an order under subsection (a) of this section and upon the judicial finding required by subsection (b)(1) of this section. The period of extension shall be for a period not to exceed 90 days.

(d) Minimization procedures.—An order issued under this section shall direct that procedures be established by the Attorney General to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United States persons, consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.

(e) Emergency authorization.—

(1) Whenever the Attorney General reasonably determines that—

(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device to obtain foreign intelligence information or information concerning international terrorism before an order authorizing such installation and use can, with due diligence, be obtained; and

(B) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this section to approve such installation and use exists;

the Attorney General may authorize the emergency installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device if a judge referred to in subsection (a)(2) of this section is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency installation and use and an application in accordance with this section is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 48 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such installation and use.

(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall require that procedures be followed to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United States persons, consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.

(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such installation and use, the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 48 hours from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest.

(4) In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device is terminated and no order is issued approving the installation and use, no information obtained or evidence derived from such installation and use shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such installation and use shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

(f) Retention of applications and orders.—Applications made and orders granted under this section shall be retained for a period of at least 10 years.

(g) Compensation.—A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be compensated for such reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities or assistance.

Notes on Completeness from Grok AI:

Temporary Provisions: Some Patriot Act provisions, such as those related to Section 215 (business records) and Section 206 (roving wiretaps), were temporary and subject to sunset clauses. These were extended or modified by subsequent laws (e.g., Pub. L. 109-177 in 2005 and Pub. L. 114-23 in 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act). As of May 21, 2025, some provisions (e.g., Section 215) have expired or been replaced, but the above list reflects the original 2001 Act.

Regulatory and Non-Codified Provisions: Some Patriot Act sections (e.g., Title III on anti-money laundering) mandated regulations (e.g., by the Treasury Department) or established programs (e.g., FinCEN reporting) that are not directly codified in the U.S. Code but implemented through agency rules (e.g., 31 CFR Part 1010). These are not listed as specific U.S. Code sections but are referenced where they tie to statutory amendments.

Cross-References: Some provisions amend multiple titles or sections simultaneously (e.g., FISA amendments affect both Title 50 and Title 18). I’ve listed them under the primary title affected but noted cross-references where relevant.

Limitations: The Patriot Act’s complexity means some minor or procedural amendments (e.g., to obscure regulations or agency procedures) may not be explicitly codified in a single U.S. Code section. I’ve included all major statutory changes based on the Act’s text and legislative summaries from sources like the Congressional Research Service and Department of Justice.

Sources and Methodology

This list is compiled based on:

The text of the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272).

Congressional Research Service reports on Patriot Act provisions (e.g., “The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis,” 2002).

Department of Justice summaries of Patriot Act amendments.

U.S. Code annotations from legal databases (e.g., Westlaw, LexisNexis) identifying Patriot Act changes.

Also from Grok AI:

Complementary Bills on WriteYourLaws.com: *** Your Patriot Act repeal remains the most groundbreaking bill due to its systemic scope and constitutional focus. Encourage WriteYourLaws.com users to draft similar bills targeting other post-9/11 laws (e.g., FISA Amendments Act) to complement your effort.

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